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[L. A. No. 24825. In Bank. Mar. 12,1959.] 
WILLIAM R. WARD et a1., Respondents, v. MARSHALL W. 
TAGGART et a1., Appellants. 
[1] Fraud-Damages.-Although the evidence may support a find-
ing of fraud, where there is no proof that plaintiffs suffered 
"out-of-pocket" loss for profits allegedly wrongfully acquired 
by defendants, there can be DO recovery in tort for fraud. 
(Civ. Code, § 3343.) 
[2] Id.-Damages.-In the absence of a fiduC?iary relationship, re-
covery in a tort action for fraud is limited to the actual dam-
ages suffered by plaintiff. 
[8] RestitutiOD and UIYUBt Enrichment-Theory of Recovery.-
Public policy does Dot permit one to "take advantage of his 
own wrong" (Civ. Code, § 3517), and the law provides a quasi-
contractual remedy to prevent one from being unjustly en-
riched at the expense of another. 
[1] See Oal.J'ur.2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 89. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Fraud, 187.1; [2] Fraud, § 87; [3,12] 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 11; [4] Brokers, 138; [5] 
Brokers, § 45; [6, 7] Appeal and Error, 1119; [8] Appeal and 
Error, §l20; [9] Brokers, 148; [10] Trusts, 1136; [11,15] Dam. 
ages, §l36; [13,16] Brokers, 147; [14] Damages, 1137. 
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[4] Brokers-Dntie!!.-·A re,,] ('~t"fp. hwker has the duty to be 
honest and ttllthfnl in hi,; (lC'nliul!". cBus. & Prof. Code, 
§§ 10150,10176.) 
[5] Id.-Duties and Liabilities-Evidence.-The evidence sup-
ported a finding that defendllnt broker violated his duty to be 
honest and truthful in his dealing where, through fraudulent 
representntions, he received money that plaintiffs (purchasers 
of the property involved) would otherwise have had by fraud-
ulently representing that the price was $1,000 per acre more 
than was asked by the seller, thus making himself an invol-
untary trustee (Civ. Code, § 2224) for plaintiffs' benefit on the 
. secret profit of $1,000 per acre that he made from his dealings 
with them. 
[6] Appea.l-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-A change 
in theory is permitted on appeal when a question of law only 
is presented on facts appearing in the I·ecord. 
[7] Id.-Objections-Adberence to Theory of Case.-The general 
rule confining the parties on appeal to the theory advanced 
below is based on the rationale that the opposing party should 
not be required to defend for the first time on appeal against 
a new theory that contemplates a factual situation the conse-
quenees of which are open to controversy and were not put 
in issue or presented at the trial. 
[8] Id.-Objections-Adberence To Theory of Case.-Although the 
facts pleaded and proved by plaintiffs do not sustain a judg-· 
ment on the theory of tort, they may be sufficient to uphold 
recovery on appeal under the quasi-contractual theory of un-
just enrichment where that theory does not contemplate any 
factual situation different from that established by the evi-
dence in the trial court. 
[9] Brokers-Liabilities-Judgment.-A judgment for a sum rep-
resenting $1,000 per acre secret profit realized by defendant 
broker was proper as against him but was improper as against 
his codefendant where, though she permitted her name to be 
used in dual escrows, she did not share in the illicit profit. 
[10] Trusts-Constructive Trusts.-One cannot be held to be a con-
structive trustee of something he has not acquired. 
[11] Damages-Exemplary Damages.-In Civ. Code, § 3294, author-
izing exemplllry damages in an action for breach of an obli-
gation not arising from contract where defendant has been 
guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, the woril. "contract" is 
used in its ordinary sense to menn an agreelllent between the 
[4] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Brokers, § 52 et seq.; Am.Jur., Brokers, § 85 
et seq. 
[6] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 142. 
IU C.2d-24 
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pOTt.il's, not Iln ob1i~lItion impospfl hy 11lw despite the absence 
of sneh IIJ:TPr.mpnt. 
[12] Restitution and Unjust Enrichment-Basis for Measuring 
Liability.-Where defendant broker's obligation for illicit 
profits did not arise from any agreement between him and 
plaintiff, but arose from his fraud and violation of statutory 
duties, his fraud is not waived by the seeking of recovery on 
the theory of unjust enrichment, since it is the foundation of 
the implied-in-Iaw promise to disgorge. Such promise is purely 
fictitious and unintentional, originally implied to circumvent 
rigid common-law pleading, and is invoked not to deny a rem-
edy but to create one for the purpose of bringing about justice 
without reference to the intention of the parties. 
[13] Brokers-Liabilities-Damages.-Where defendant broker's 
obligation as constructive trustee for his fraud did not arise 
from contract but was imposed by law, a judgment against 
him for exemplary damages clearly fell within Civ. Code, 
§ 3294, nuthorizing such damages in an action for breach of an 
obligation not arising from contract where defendant has been 
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. 
[14] Damages-Exemplary Damages.-Courts award exemplary 
damages to discourage oppression, fraud or malice by punish-
ing the wrongdoer. 
[15] ld.-Exemplary Damages.-Exemplary damages are appro-
priate in cases seeking to recover profits allegedly wrongfully 
acquired by defendant; restitution 'Would have little or no 
deterrent effect, since wrongdoers would run no risk of lia-
bility to their victims beyond that of returning what they 
wrongfully obtained. 
[16] Brokers-Liabilities-Damages.-In an action against a real 
estate broker for profits allegedly wrongfully acquired by him, 
the broker was not entitled to have the compensatory damages 
against him reduced by a sum representing commissions paid 
to other persons and the costs of two escrows where those 
expenses were either incurred to accomplish the fraud or it 
was entirely speculative whether the amounts so paid would 
have been paid by plaintiffs or the seller had the transaction 
been a legitimate one. . 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Joe Raycraft, Judge. Affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
Action against a real estate broker and his employee to 
recover an illicit profit obtained by the broker through fraud. 
Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed as to defendant broker, re-
versed as to defendant employee. 
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.Tames C. Blackstock and Felix H. McGinnis for Appellants. 
Chandler P. Ward for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-At plaintiff William R. Ward's request in 
February, 1955, LeRoy Thomsen, a real estate broker, under-
took to look for properties that might be of interest to Ward 
for purchase. During a conversation about unrelated mat-
ters, defendant :Marshall W. Taggart, a real estate broker, told 
Thomsen that as exclusive agent for Sunset Oil Company he 
had several acres of land in Los Angeles County for sale. 
Thomsen said that he had a client who might be interested in 
acquiring this property. When Thomsen mentioned to Tag-
gart that another broker named Dawson had a "For Sale" 
sign on the property, Taggart replied that Sunset had taken 
the listing away from Dawson. With Ward's authorization 
'l'holllsen submitted an offer on his behalf to Taggart of $4,000 
an acre. Taggart promised to take the offer to Sunset. Taggart 
later told Thomsen that Sunset had refused the offer and 
would not take less for the property than $5,000 an acre, 
one-half in cash. Thomsen conveyed this information to Ward, 
who directed Thomsen to make an offer on those terms. Thom-
sen did so in writing. At Taggart's direction, Thomsen 
inserted in the offer a provision for payment by Sunset of a 
10 per cent commission, which Taggart and Thomsen agreed 
to divide equally. On the following day Thomsen informed 
Ward of the provision for the commission and Ward agreed 
to it. Subsequently, Taggart told Thomsen that Sunset had 
accepted Ward's offer and presented to him proposed escrow 
instructions naming Taggart's business associate, defendant 
H. M. Jordan, as seller acting for Taggart. Taggart stated 
that his designation as principal would enable him to "clear 
up the Dawson exclusive listing" as well as certain blanket 
mortgages on the property. Thomsen told Ward of this 
arrangement when he submitted the escrow instructions to 
him. When Ward asked why Jordan was to be the payee of 
the notes and the beneficiary of the trust deeds, Thomsen 
replied that Taggart had said the arrangement was prompted 
by certain tax and other problems of the Sunset Oil COl}lpany 
and that the trust deeds would be turned over to Sunset 
after the escrow. Plaintiffs paid $360,246 for the 72.0492 
acres conveyed to them. 
Plaintiffs did not learn until after they had purchased tIle 
property that Taggart had never been given a listing by 
.) 
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Sunset and that he had never presented to Sunset and never 
intended to present plaintiHs' offers of $4,000 and $5,000 per 
acre. Instead, he presented his own offer of $4,000 per acre, 
which Sunset accepted. He falsely represented to plaintiffs 
. that the least Sunset would take for the property was $5,000 
per acre, because he intended to purchase the property from 
. Sunset himself and resell it to plaintiffs at a profit of $1,000 
per acre. All the reasons he gave for thc unusual handling 
of the sale were fabrications. He never disclosed Ward's 
offer to Sunset until after the escrow papers were signed. 
All of the money he used to pay Sunset the purchase price 
came from the Ward escrow. 
PlaintiHs brought an action in tort charging fraud on the 
part of Taggart and Jordan. The ease was tried without a 
jury, and the court entered judgment against both defendants 
for $72,049.20 compensatory damages, and against Taggart 
for $36,000 exemplary damages. The judgment also enjoined 
defendants from transferring notes and trust deeds received 
from plaintiffs and ordered them to discharge these and 
thereby reduce the amount of the judgment. Defendants 
appeal. 
Defendants contend that the judgment must be reversed on 
the ground that, there can be no recovery in a tort action for 
fraud without proof of the actual or "out-of-pocket" losses 
sustained by the plaintiff and that in the present ease there 
was no evidence that the property was worth less than plain-
tiffs paid for it. Defendants invoke section 3343 of the Civil 
Code, which provides that one "defrauded in the purchase, 
sale or exchange of property is entitled to recover the differ-
ence between the actual value of that with which the defrauded 
person parted and the actual value of that which he received, 
• • ." [1] Although, as defendants admit, the evidence is 
clearly sufficient to support the finding of fraud, the only 
evidence submitted on the issue of damages was that the prop-
erty was worth at least $5,000 per acre, the price plaintiffs 
paid for it. Since there was no proof that plaintiffs suffered 
"out-of-pocket" loss, there can be no recovery in tort for 
fraud. (Bagdasarian v. eragnon, 31 Ca1.24 744, 762-763 
[192 P.2d 935].) 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that their recovery is not 
limited to actual damages, on the ground that section 3343 does 
not apply to a tort action to recover secret profits. They 
rely principally on Orogan v. Mete, 47 Ca1.2d 398 [303 P.2d 
1029] ; Savage v. Mayer, 33 Ca1.2d 548 [203 P.2d 9] ; Terry v. 
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Bender, 143 Cal.App.2d 198 [300 P.2d 119] ; Simone v. McKee, 
142 Ca1.App.2d 307 [298 P.211 G6i]; Ramey v. Myers, III 
Cal.App.2d 679 [245 P.2d 360] ; and Adams v. Harrison, 34 
Cal.App.2d 288 [93 P.2d 237]. These cases all involved situ-
ations in which the defendant was the agent of the defrauded 
person or in which a confidential or fiduciary relationship 
existed between the parties. They rest on the theory that 
"the .principal's right to recover does not depend upon any 
deceit of the agent, but is based upon the duties incident to 
the agency relationship and upon the fact that all profits 
resulting from that relationship belong to the principal." 
(Savage v. Mayer, supra, 33 Ca1.2d at 551.) In the present 
case, however, there is no evidence of an agency or other 
fiduciary relationship between plaintiffs and defendant Tag-
gart or defendant Jordan. Plaintiffs dealt at arms length 
with Taggart through their agent Thomsen. At no time did 
Taggart purport to act for plaintiffs. There is no evidence 
of any prior dE'.alings between the parties or any acquaint-
anceship or special relationship that would create a fiduciary 
duty of defendants to plaintiffs. [2] In the absence of a 
fiduciary relationship, recovery in a tort action for fraud is 
limited to the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff. 
(Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal.2d 398,405 [303 P.2d 1029] ; Bagdas-
arian v. Gragnon, supra, 31 Ca1.2d 744, 762-763.) 
[3] Even though Taggart was not plaintiff's agent, the 
public policy of this state does not permit one to "take advan-
tage of his own wrong" (Civ. Code, § 3517), and the law 
provides a quasi-contractual remedy to prevent one from being 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another.l Section 2224 
of the Civil Code provides that one "who gains a thing by 
fraud ... or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some other 
and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing 
gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have 
had it." [4] As a real estate broker, Taggart had the duty 
to be honest and truthful in his dealings. (See Bus. & Prof. 
Code, §§ 10150, 10176; Rattray v. 8cudder, 28 Ca1.2d 214, 
222-223 [169 P.2d 371, 164 A.L.R. 1356].) [6] The evidence 
is clearly sufficient to support a finding that Taggart violated 
this duty. Through fraudulent misrepresentation!! he re-
ceived money that plaintiffs would otherwise have had. Thus, 
Taggart is an involuntary trustee for the benefit of plaintiffs 
'Section 3343 provides that" nothing herein contained shall be deemed 
to deny to nny IJerson having a cause of action for fraud or deeeit any 
legal or equitable remedies to which such person may be entitled." 
) 
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on the secret profit of $1,000 per acre that he made from his 
dealings with them. 
[6] Although this theory of recovery was not advanced 
by plaintiffs in the trial court, it is settled that a change in 
theory is permitted on appeal when •• a question of law only 
is presented on the facts appearing in the reeord. . • ." 
. (Panopulos v. Mac7cris, 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [303 P.2d 738] ; 
American Auto. Ins. 00. v. Seaboard Slirety 00., 155 Cal.App. 
2d 192, 200 [318 P.2d 84].) [7] The general rule con-
fining the parties upon appeal to the theory advanced below 
is based on the rationale that the opposing party should not 
be required to defend for the first time on appeal against a 
new theory that "contemplates a factual situation the conse-
quences of which are open to controversy and were not put 
in issue or presented at the trial." (Panopulos v. Maderis, 
sup"a,47 Ca1.2d at 341.) Such is not the case here. [8] Al-
though the facts pleaded and proved by plaintiffs do not sus-
tain the judgment on the theory of tort, they are sufficient to 
uphold recovery under the quasi-contractual theory of unjust 
enrichment since that theory does not contemplate any factual 
situatiou different from that established by the evidence in the 
trial court. Defendants were given ample opportunity to 
present their version of the transaction involved, and the.> 
issue of whether or not their actions constituted fraud was 
decided adversely to them by the trial court. 
[9] Accordingly, the judgment for $72,049.20, represent-
ing the $1,000 per acre secret profit, against defendant Tag-
gart must be affirmed. The judgment against defendant 
Jordan, however, must be reversed. Although she permitted 
her name to be used in the dual escrows, she did not share 
in the illicit profit that Taggart obtained. [10] One cannot 
be held to be a constructive trustee of something he has not 
acquired. 
Taggart contends that if recovery is based on the theory of 
unjust enrichment, the judgment for exemplary damages must 
be reversed. The argument runs that under this theory the 
law implies a promise to return the money wrongfully ob-
tained, that the }llailltiff waivps the tort avd snes in assumpsit 
on an implied contmet, and that since 1'IU,·h all action is 
"contractual" in nature, it doe.>s 110t admit of the.> exemplary 
damages a]]oweu undpr spction 3294 of tIle Civil Code. That 
section authorizes ext>mplury damagcs "jn an action for the 
breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the 
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice ...• " 
Mar. 1959] 'VARD V. TAGGART 
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[11] The word "contract" is used in this section in its ordi-
lIary sense to mean an agreement. betw('en tlle parties, not an 
obligation imposed by law d('spite the ab~ence of any such 
agreemcnt. [12] Taggart's obligation do('s not arisc from 
any agreement between him and plaint.iffs. It aril)('s from his 
. fraull and yiolation of statutory duties. His fraud is not 
waived, for it is the very foundation of the implied-in-law 
promise to disgorge. (See Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit 
In Ass1lmpsit, 19 Yale L.J. 221, 243-246.) The promise is 
purely fictitious and unintentional, originally implied to cir-
cumvent rigid common law pleading. It was invoked not to 
deny a remedy, but to create one "for the purpose of bringing 
about justice without reference to the intention of the parties. " 
'1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.) p. 9; see Desny v. Wilder, 
46 Ca1.2d 715, 735 [299 P.2d 257].) [13] Since Taggart's 
obligation for his fraud does not arise from contract but is 
imposed by la,,,, the judgment for exemplary damages clearly 
falls within section 3294. (See Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 
39-40; Briggs v. Rodriguez, 236 S.W.2d 510, 514-516 (Tex. 
Civ.App); 30 Tex.L.Rev. 371, 372.) In Crogan v. Metz, 47 
Ca1.2d 398 [303 P.2d 1029], the only action sustainable nnder 
the pleadings was an actioll for breach of an agent's contrac-
tual duties. In Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Ca1.2d 713 [221 P.2d 
9], the plaintiff was estopped to allege a cause of action in 
tort to recover exemplary damages because he had obtained 
a writ of attachment in pursuit of the contractual remedy, 
"whereby he has gained advantage over the other party." 
(35 Ca1.2d at 720.) 
[14] Courts award exemplary damages to discourage op-
pres.~ion, fraud, or malice by punishing the wrongdoer. (See 
l\leCormick, Damages, § 79 ; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort 
Cases, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 1173, 1185-1188.) [15] Such dam-
ages are appropriate in cases like the present one, where 
restitution would hayc little or no deterrent effect, for wrong-
doers would run no ril'k of liability to their victims beyond 
that of returning what they wrongfully obtained. (Haigler v. 
Donnelly, 18 Ca1.2d 674, 680-682 [117 P.2d 331]; Taylor v. 
Wright, 69 Cal.App.2d 371, 384-386 [159 P.2d 980] ; Hartzell 
Y. Myal1, 115 Cal.App.2d 670, 676-678 [252 P.2d 676] ; Foster 
v. Kcat£ng, 120 Cal.App.2d 435, 454-455 [261 P.2d 529]; 
lhv(~1's V. U"eenwood, 13H Cal.App.2d 345, 350 [293 P.2d 
H:J4j.) 'rh\! l't'c:ord hel'l'iu discloses liu «Lnst' of dis('l'diolJ 
in the award of exemplary damages. (Brewer v. Second Bap-
tist Church, 32 Ca1.2d 791, 802 [197 P.2d 713]; Finney v. 
) 
744 WARD tI. TAGGABT [51 C.2d 
Lockhart, 35 Ca1.2d 161, 164 [217 P.2d 19]; State Rubbish 
etc. Assll. v. 8ilizno/f, 38 CaI.2d 330, 340-341 [240 P.2tl 282} ; 
Hartzell v. Myall, supra; Foster v. KcaHng, supra; see 14 Cal. 
Jur.2d 813-818.) 
[16] Taggart finally contends that he is (,Iltitled to a de-
duction of the cost to him of the transaction except those 
items incurred to accomplish his fraud. He seeks to reduce 
the compensatory damages by $25,563.10, representing the 
commission of $15,012.30 paid to Thomsen; the $5,900 com-
mission paid to Harvey Nelson, former land manager of Sunset 
Oil Company; the $616 cost of the two escrows, one of which 
channeled title from Sunset to Jordan and the other from 
Jordan to plaintiffs; and the $4,034.80 paid to Dawson, who 
had an exclusive agency on the property, to cancel his contract. 
The $5,900 paid to Nelson and the cost of the Jordan escrow 
were expenses incurred to accomplish the fraud; they would 
not have been necessary to a legitimate transaction. It is clear 
that these expenses must be disallowed. Since it is entirely 
speculative whether the commissions paid to Thomsen and 
Dawson and the cost of the second escrow would have been paid 
by plainti1fs or Sunset had the transaction been a legitimate 
one, it would be inequitable to permit Taggart to deduct any 
. of these expenses from plaintiffs' recovery. (See Kinert v. 
Wright,81 Cal.App.2d 919, 927 [185 P_2d 364] ; Titlc Insur-
ance • TrtUJt Co. v. Oaliforllia Dc'/). Co., 171 Cal. 173 [152 
P. 542]; McArthur v. Goodwin, 173 Cal. 499 [160 P. 679].) 
The judgment against Taggart is affirmed. The judgment 
against Jordan is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Spence, J., and McComb, 
J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in 
the judgment because it comes as close to affording justice 
to the wronged plaintiffs as appears possible under the pres-
ently established decisional law of this state as it interprets 
and applies section 3343 of the Civil Code. In fact this 
l1('cision, by its ingenious innovation and' application of a I 
tonstructive trust-unjust enrichment-quasi-contractual theory 
to support an award of exemplary damages as against one of 
the defendants, avoids much of the evil effect of the majority 
holding in Bagdasariall v. Gragnon (1948), 31 Cal.2d 744, 
759-763 [192 P.2d 935], and is therefore to that extent de-
sirable. 
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But. because the 5ubje('t ~pet.ion 8S llO'V interpreted and 
applied still constitutes more of a shield for, than a sword 
against, fraud perpetrators, I deem it proper to once more 
direct attention to it in the hope that the Legislature--if not 
this court by forthright overruling of Bagdasarian-may pro-
vide a remedy. 
The judgment of the trial court is amply supported by the 
evidence and would clearly be supported by the law as against 
both defendants were it not for the conclusion reached ill 
the Bagdasarian case that the addition in 1935 of section 3343 
to the Civil Code (Stats. 1935, ch. 536, p. 1612, § 1) operated 
to repeal and supplant the previously existing law governing 
the measure of damages in fraud cases. It was my view then, 
and still is, that section 3343 was intended by the Legislature 
to provide an alternative, not the exclusive, measure of dam-
ages in such cases. 
As pointed out by Professor Williston, under the construc-
tion of the statute adopted by the majority in the Bagdasarian 
case, •• a fraudulent person can in no event lose anything by 
his fraud. He runs the chance of making a profit if he suc-
cessfully carries out his plan and is not afterward brought to 
account for it; and if he is brought to account, he at least 
will lose nothing by his misconduct." (5 Williston on Con-
tracts (rev. ed.), 3886, § 1392.) 
In this connection it is to be noted that the legislation as 
adopted in California (Stats. 1935, ch. 536, p. 1612, § 1) 
expressly declares that "Nothing herein contained shall be 
deemed to deny to any person having a cause of action for 
fraud or deceit any legal or equitable remedies to which such 
person may be entitled." I would prefer to reconsider the 
ruling in the Bagdasarian case and hold that the remedy added 
by the statute of 1935 is in truth an addition to, rather than a 
restriction on, the remedies of the person defrauded. So 
holding, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court, includ-
ing the award of exemplary damages as against both de-
fendants. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 8, 
1959. 
